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ABSTRACT
This article examines the practice of “tying,” which occurs when an underwriter lends to an issuer
around the time of a public securities offering. We examine whether there are efficiencies from tying
lending and underwriting which lead to benefits for issuers and underwriters. We find evidence
consistent with tying occurring for issues when there are informational economies of scope from
combining lending and underwriting. Firms benefit from tying through lower financing costs, as tied
issuers receive lower underwriter fees on seasoned equity offerings and discounted loan yield
spreads. These financing costs are significantly reduced for non-investment grade issuers, where
informational economies of scope from combining lending with underwriting are likely to be large.
These results are robust to matching methodology developed by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd
(1997, 1998). For underwriters, tying helps build relationships that augment an underwriter’s
expected revenues by increasing the probability of receiving both current and future business. Both
commercial banks and investment banks tie lending and underwriting and offer price discounts,
albeit in different ways, with commercial banks discounting loan yield spreads and investment banks
offering reduced underwriter spreads.
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1.  Introduction 
 
For many years, the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act prevented commercial banks from underwriting 
corporate bonds and equities.  Due to the recent relaxation and eventual repeal of the Act, 
commercial banks acquired investment banks, or developed investment-banking capabilities 
internally, to create universal banks that can offer an array of financial services.   
The entry of commercial banks into underwriting markets has increased the potential for 
financial institutions to tie products, such as packaging loans with underwriting services.  In fact, 
tying has increased substantially over time  -- in 1994, only 1% of seasoned equity issuers 
received a loan from their underwriter at around the time of issuance, but by 2001, over 20% of 
all deals were tied.  The tying of lending and underwriting raises a host of interesting questions.  
First, why are deals tied?  Are there efficiencies resulting from the tying of lending and 
underwriting?  Tying might allow for potential efficiency gains due to informational economies 
of scope that can result from the bank jointly delivering services and using the same client-
specific information for multiple purposes (see e.g. Benston, 1990; Saunders and Walter, 1994).  
Therefore, tying might be useful when there are large potential economies of scope from 
combining lending and underwriting.  This would suggest that certain kinds of deals are tied, but 
not others.  Second, who benefits from tying?  Lower costs could arise due to informational 
economies of scope, and issuers can benefit if the bank passes along these savings.  For the 
underwriter, tying might help build relationships that improve the probability of securing current 
and future business from the firm.  Third, do the benefits from tying vary by the type of 
underwriter involved in the transaction?  It is possible that commercial banks are able to generate 
larger economies of scope than investment banks due to their well-established lending 
businesses.  Therefore, there may exist differences in tied deals that are underwritten by 
investment banks as opposed to commercial banks.   
In this paper, we address these issues empirically by studying the tying of loans to 
seasoned equity offerings.  To tackle these questions, we use a unique data set that is carefully 
assembled from multiple databases and augmented by hand collected data.   We gather data on 
seasoned equity issuers, including each firm’s credit rating, stock returns, issuance history, and 
lending history.  We identify prior underwriting and lending relationships between each issuer   2 
and potential underwriter, as well as each underwriter’s ranking and level and quality of analyst 
coverage.  Further, we collect data on underwriter fees, loan pricing, and lending terms.   
We find that there is a distinct profile of issues that are tied.  The majority of tied deals 
involve clients that are highly leveraged and are non-investment grade rated.  One explanation 
for this is that for lower rated and highly leveraged firms, there are larger potential efficiency 
gains that arise due to informational economies of scope from combining lending and 
underwriting.  Therefore, tying lending and underwriting for these issuers could produce 
substantial benefits.  To study if issuers actually benefit from tying, we examine the impact of 
tying on issuers’ financing costs.  Our results suggest that tying lowers issuers’ financing costs 
through two main dimensions – (i) a reduced underwriter fee for the equity offering, and (ii) 
discounted yield spreads of tied loans as compared with “matched” non-tied loans.  Interestingly, 
we find that the cost reductions are more pronounced amongst issuers that are non-investment 
grade rated, where the expected informational economies of scope are relatively large.   
To ensure that matching biases are not driving the yield spread discount, we use the 
econometric techniques developed by Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997, 1998).  These 
econometric methods effectively take into account the fact that the characteristics of tied loans 
may differ significantly from non-tied loans and ensure that such observed characteristics are not 
driving the results.  Using a variety of matching models, we confirm that tied loans are 
significantly cheaper than comparable loans.   
To examine if underwriters benefit from tying, we look at the impact of tying on the 
underwriter’s relationship with the firm.  In particular, we investigate if the same bank is selected 
for current and future equity underwriting mandates.  We find that tying significantly increases 
the probability of securing current equity underwriting business.  We also find that tied issuers 
go back to the equity market more frequently than non-tied issuers, and issuers who are tied to 
investment bank underwriters are more likely to keep the same underwriter.  The results are 
consistent with tied loans helping to build relationships that increase an underwriter’s expected 
revenues.  
We also examine if the benefits from tying vary by the type of underwriter involved in 
the transaction.   Interestingly, while commercial banks are well positioned to tie lending and 
underwriting due to their existing lending businesses, we discover that investment banks 
underwrote a significant portion of tied deals.  This suggests that investment banks have now   3 
developed the organizational infrastructure to tie lending and underwriting and is consistent with 
there being potential gains from a single entity offering both lending and underwriting services.
1  
Our results indicate that commercial banks and investment banks both compete for tied deals.  
However they seem to compete through different components of the tied deals -- commercial 
banks are more likely to offer discounted yield spreads on tied loans while investment banks are 
more likely to discount the underwriter spread for the SEO.  This is consistent with each type of 
underwriter competing more aggressively in its area of expertise and in the area where it is more 
likely to generate future business.  Investment banks discount underwriter spreads and receive 
more future underwriting business.  Commercial banks discount loan yield spreads, which is 
consistent with establishing a lending relationship that helps generate other banking business. 
This paper adds to the growing literature on how underwriters and issuers associate with 
each other.  An important question is what determines the pairing of firms and underwriters for 
current as well as for future deals.  Studies suggest that underwriter reputation is an important 
determinant of the choice of underwriter (Booth and Smith, 1986; Carter and Manaster, 1990), 
and high quality issuers are more likely to associate with high quality underwriters (Fernando et. 
al, 2003).  Underwriter capability in terms of all-star analyst coverage has been found to be 
important in affecting investment banking deal flow (Clarke et. al., 2003; Corwin and Schultz, 
2003) and for switching from one underwriter to another (Krigman et. al, 2001), though there is 
little evidence to suggest that aggressive analyst recommendations increase the bank’s 
probability of winning an underwriting mandate (Ljungqvist et. al, 2003).  In this paper, we find 
that prior lending as well as simultaneous lending by the underwriter to the firm significantly 
affect firm-underwriter pairings and the pricing of underwriting services.  Lending activities are 
important not just for current firm-underwriter association but also for future transactions and 
help create durable relationships that can benefit the issuer through lower financing costs.
2  Our 
findings also underscore that firm-underwriter pairings can differ by underwriter type and not 
simply by underwriter reputation and analyst coverage, as we find important differences between 
commercial bank and investment bank underwriters.   
                                                 
1 For example, Morgan Stanley participated in a $6.5 billion bank loan for Lucent Technologies and was 
subsequently awarded the role of underwriter on Lucent’s spinoff of Agere Technologies (see “Lucent Deal Shows 
Wall Street Takes on Greater Risk,” The Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2001, C1).  Moreover, investment banks 
are increasing their lending capacity, with Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Morgan Stanley forming bank 
subsidiaries (see “Morgan Stanley Injects About $2 Billion Into Bank Unit, Aiming to Boost Lending,” The Wall 
Street Journal, August 16, 2001, B7). 
2 See also Ljungqvist et. al (2003) for additional sources of durability in bank-issuer relationships.     4 
This paper also contributes to the literature on universal banking and the implications of 
allowing banks to underwrite securities.  Regulators have recently raised questions on the firm-
level and competitive effects of the relaxation and repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act (see e.g., 
Berger, et. al, 1999; Santomero and Eckles, 2000) as well as the implications of tie-ins.
3  Related 
to these concerns, the theoretical literature has examined the potential for commercial banks and 
investment banks to co-exist, as well as the implications of such a scenario (see e.g., Boot and 
Thakor, 1997; Kanatas and Qi, 1998, 2003; Puri, 1999; Rajan, 2002; Stefanadis, 2004).  
However, the possibility that investment banks might respond by expanding  into lending 
activities has generally not received much attention.  Our results bring to light some similarities 
and differences in the ways that investment banks and commercial banks compete for 
underwriting business.  We also add to the evidence on implications of combining lending with 
underwriting.  Much of the empirical literature that examines when banks lend and underwrite 
investigates the effect of bank lending, and the private information contained therein, on the 
banks’ underwriting of public securities.
4   These effects are ascertained through the pricing of 
underwritten securities (see e.g., Puri, 1996; Gande et. al, 1997; Yasuda, 2003; Benzoni and 
Schenone, 2004) or through long run performance (see e.g., Ang and Richardson, 1994; 
Kroszner and R ajan, 1994; Puri, 1994). An important but unexplored issue is the reverse 
question – how do potential underwriting opportunities affect banks’ lending, and how does this 
affect the financing cost of the issuing firm?  This paper provides a first step in addressing this 
question.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the data and our 
sample selection process.  We present the major empirical findings in Section 3.  Section 4 
concludes. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 U.S. House Representative Dingell highlights some regulatory concerns in a letter to Chairman Greenspan and 
Com ptroller Hawke (see “Letter to FRB and OCC re: ‘pay to play’ practices,” July 11, 2002). 
4 In related literature, James (1987), Lummer and McConnell (1989), Best and Zhang (1993), and Billett, Flannery 
and Garfinkel (1995), among others, find that new loans, loan renewals, and lender identity carry (positive) private 
information to the outside equity market about a borrowing firm’s financial condition.  See James and Smith (2000) 
for a comprehensive review of the past and recent research on the special nature of bank loan financing.  This 
literature examines the effect of bank lending absent an underwriting role for the bank.   5 
2.  Data and Sample Selection 
 
A natural way to capture the tying of loans and underwritings is to take all instances when a 
financial institution underwrites a firm’s public securities and lends to the firm simultaneously.   
However, in practice even if there is an implicit agreement to this effect, there may be a few 
months lag between the reported transactions.  Hence, the definition we adopt is if the firm 
received a loan from the underwriter of the SEO between six months prior to and six months 
after the SEO, we classify the loan as a “tied loan” and the SEO as a “tied deal.”  As a robustness 
check to this definition, we also reran our estimations where we defined tied loans to be those 
loans that were originated between three months prior to and three months after the SEO.  This 
sample produces qualitatively similar results. 
We select our sample period based on the following factors.  First, we hope to capture an 
active period of tying.  Table 1 shows that tied deals were nearly non-existent before 1996, and 
with the exception of the year 2000, the proportion of tied deals increases each year.  The decline 
in tied deals in the year 2000 may be due to a noticeable decline in telecom and cable SEOs, 
which account for around one-third of all tied deals, and a very high proportion of technology 
offerings, which account for only a small percentage of tied deals.  Second, since we will be 
examining if the issuers proceed with a subsequent SEO, we must provide enough time to 
capture the decisions of end of sample issuers.  Based on these considerations, we define our 
sample period as January 1, 1996 through May 31, 2001.   
We construct a unique database using eight different data sources and hand-collected 
data.  Data on seasoned equity offerings comes from Thomson Financial’s SDC Platinum United 
States New Issues database, from which we download underwritten, seasoned, US Common 
Stock issues.  Since we wish to study industrial firms, we remove financial firms (companies 
with a one-digit SIC code of 6).  The sample consists of 2301 issues.  We hand match, by issuer 
name, each of the 2301 issuers to the Loan Pricing Corporation’s (LPC) DealScan database to 
identify if the firm received a tied loan from their underwriter and in doing so, we identify if the 
SEO is a tied deal.
5   There are 201 tied deals in the sample and 2100 non-tied deals.   
                                                 
5 LPC DealScan collects its loan data from SEC filings, and it receives data from large loan syndicators and from a 
staff of reporters.  As such, DealScan is well-suited to studying the borrowing activity of companies with public 
equity and debt.  Since all of the companies in our sample have public equity, we should observe the vast majority of   6 
We classify each underwriter as an “investment bank” or a “commercial bank” based on 
the status of the parent/holding company of the underwriter at the time of the issue.
6  Due to the 
many mergers and acquisitions i n the financial sector, we use the mergers and acquisitions 
database from SDC  Platinum  to aid in classification.  For example, NationsBank acquired 
Montgomery Securities on 10/1/1997.  Montgomery Securities is classified as an investment 
bank prior to 10/1/1997, but after 10/1/1997, we classify it as a commercial bank.  Commercial 
banks underwrote 91 tied SEOs and 591 non-tied SEOs, while investment banks underwrote the 
remaining 110 tied SEOs and 1509 non-tied SEOs.   
We will study how tying affects the pricing of bank services and the ability of the 
underwriter to generate equity underwriting business.  As a result, we need to control for factors 
that may alter fees, pricing, or the likelihood that an issuer selects an underwriter.  Prior 
underwriting relationships are likely to be important in both the selection of a bank and the 
pricing of banking services (see e.g., Baker, 1990; James, 1992; Crane and Eccles, 1993; 
Ljungqvist et. al, 2003).  Furthermore, it is possible that prior lending relationships could also 
influence underwriter selection and the pricing of services.  In particular, if there are economies 
of scope in lending and underwriting, then a prior lending relationship may result in a reduced 
underwriter fee or other pricing differences.  When identifying prior lending and underwriting 
relationships, we account for mergers between potential underwriters.  For example, Fleet Bank 
merged with BankBoston / Robertson Stephens on 10/1/1999.  When tracking relationships, we 
assume that Fleet Bank acquired all of BankBoston’s and Robertson Stephens’ prior lending and 
underwriting relationships.  From SDC Platinum, we identify 90 tied issuers and 830 non-tied 
issuers that use an underwriter that had underwritten a prior equity offering.  From DealScan, we 
identify 83 tied issuers and 103 non-tied issuers that have a prior lending relationship with the 
selected underwriter.   
Previous research indicates that we need to incorporate the reputation of the underwriter 
and the level and quality of analyst coverage into our models because these factors are likely to 
                                                                                                                                                             
their lending activity.  Dealscan has been used in previous studies for many purposes, including examining the 
effect of lending on bond yield spreads (see e.g. Gande et. al 1997) and bank effects in lending rates (Hubbard et. al 
2002). 
6 We do not separate commercial banks that internally developed investment-banking capabilities from those that 
acquired investment banks because almost all of the commercial banks developed underwriting operations by 
acquiring investment banks.  Chaplinsky and Erwin (2001) note that for commercial banks who developed 
underwriting capabilities internally, only JP Morgan acquired market share in equity underwriting that is above 
0.02% during the post-1996 period.     7 
affect the firm’s decision to select an underwriter or to switch underwriters in the future.  We 
capture the influence of reputation through the underwriter’s market share.  For each year, we 
compute each underwriter’s SEO market share by adding the principal amounts of all SEOs in 
which the bank was the underwriter and dividing this total by the principal amounts of all SEOs 
during the year.   If a merger between underwriters occurred during the year, we use the 
combined market share of the underwriters.  We rank the underwriters on a yearly basis, based 
on the market share in the previous year.
7  For example, Goldman Sachs had the highest market 
share in 1995, so in our models, issuers who have an SEO in 1996 consider Goldman Sachs to be 
the top ranked underwriter. 
We measure the level of equity analyst coverage by using the I/B/E/S Detail History, 
which contains over twelve years of forecast changes and encompasses earnings estimates from 
more than 2 00 brokerage houses and 2000 individual analysts.  We match any estimate of 
earnings per share from any analyst in the I/B/E/S database to each of the 2301 firms in our 
sample.  If the underwriter provided an earnings recommendation within one-year prior to the 
SEO date, then the underwriter provided “coverage.” To capture the quality of analyst coverage, 
we use Institutional Investor magazine’s All-America Research Team, which is published yearly 
and lists the top three analysts in each sector.  Since the report is published towards the end of 
each year, the inclusion of an analyst in the publication will most likely have its greatest impact 
on underwriter choice for issues that occur in the following year.  As a result, we define that the 
analyst (and corresponding underwriter) provided “all-star coverage” for a firm if the analyst is 
included in the All-America Research Team for the year prior to the equity issuance and 
provided an earnings recommendation within one-year prior to the SEO date. 
  Since it is necessary to control for financial characteristics and risk factors, we obtain 
financial data for each firm from the Compustat Industrial Quarterly database from Standard and 
Poor’s.  The financial data used in this study corresponds to the quarter and year of the SEO 
issue date.  The incorporation date for each firm was hand collected from Moody’s / Mergent’s 
Industrial and Transportation Manuals and Standard & Poor’s Corporation Records.  From the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) daily stock database, we download daily return, 
                                                 
7 A simultaneity problem would arise if we used the market shares from the current year to rank the underwriters 
because when an issuer selects an underwriter in the current year, the decision simultaneously increases the 
underwriter’s market share.   8 
price, and outstanding share data to compute the equity volatility and market capitalization for 
each firm. 
For each of the 201 tied deals, we gather the associated lending facilities from LPC 
DealScan.  There are 358 tied lending facilities.  The sample of tied lending facilities consists of 
116 notes, 111 revolving lines of credit, 99 term loans, seventeen 364-day facilities, 13 bridge 
loans, and two other types of facility.  
To examine differences between tied loans and non-tied loans, we create two separate 
samples.  In the hand-matching sample, for each of the tied loan facilities, we create a control 
group of non-tied loans that were originated at around the same time as the tied loan, with firms 
that belong to the same industry and have the same credit rating.  We use all loans in DealScan 
that occur between six months prior to and six months after the term facility active date of the 
tied loan.
8  We keep only those non-tied loans that have the same 2-digit SIC code and credit 
rating as the corresponding tied loan.  We remove any loan that is missing information for the 
all-in spread drawn and / or the length of the loan.
9  All bridge loans and loans with an issuer that 
is not rated are removed.  This sample has 107 tied loans that can be matched to a similar non-
tied loan, and it is comprised of 56 revolving lines of credit, 40 term loans, ten 364-day facilities, 
and one other type of facility. 
To construct the econometric-matching sample, we download all lending facilities in 
DealScan that occur between January 1, 1996 and May 31, 2001.  We remove any facility that is 
missing information for the all-in spread drawn and / or the length of the facility, and we remove 
any facility where the borrower is a financial firm (companies with a one-digit SIC code of 6).  
As before, all bridge loans and loans to non-rated borrowers are excluded.  This sample consists 
of 166 tied loans that can be matched to a sample of 6919 non-tied loans.  Seventy-four 
revolving lines of credit, 77 term loans, fourteen 364-day facilities, and one other type of facility 
form the sample of 166 tied loans.  Seventy-nine of the 166 tied loans are from commercial bank 
underwriters while the remaining 87 tied loans are provided by investment bank underwriters. 
In addition, we classify 340 lending facilities as “simultaneous loans,” which are loans to 
an issuer of an SEO that are originated between six months prior to and six months after the 
                                                 
8 We also use a sample of loans that occur between three months prior to and three months after the SEO date.  
Results using this sample are similar and are not reported. 
9 The all-in spread drawn is rate the borrower pays to the lender each year for each dollar drawn off the credit line 
(inclusive of fees), quoted in basis points over LIBOR.     9 
SEO, where the lender could have been selected to underwrite the SEO but is not provided with 
underwriting responsibilities.  Of the 6919 non-tied loans in the econometric-matching sample, 
145 lending facilities are simultaneous loans.     
 
3.  Methodology and Results 
 
Table 1 displays trends in tying over time.   It can be seen that tying increased over time from 
about 1% in 1994 to over 20% in 2001.  However, before 1996, while tying was nearly non-
existent, many issuers received loans from another bank at about the same time as the issuance of 
public securities.
10  Over time, issuers have shifted from using a commercial bank for lending 
and an investment bank for equity underwriting to employing a single entity for both of the 
simultaneous transactions.   
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the tied and non-tied SEO samples.  Tied issuers 
are highly leveraged, with debt-to-equity ratios that are, on average, five times higher than non-
tied issuers.  Furthermore, tied lenders have low credit ratings, with 71% of investment bank tied 
deals and 60% of commercial bank tied deals for junk rated issuers, and another 12% of 
investment bank deals and 27% of commercial bank deals involving issuers that are not rated.  
Since duplication of information will be particularly costly for risky firms because they will be 
subject to extensive due diligence in both lending and underwriting, tying can be extremely 
beneficial for these issuers because a single bank can use the collected information for both 
transactions.  In addition, for lower rated and highly leveraged firms, debt has similar 
characteristics to equity.  As a result, information gathered in the lending process will be relevant 
to the equity issuance, which may enhance the certification ability of the underwriter.  Therefore, 
economies of scope are likely to be high for these firms, and tying may be an efficient response 
to banks’ ability to use information across product lines.   
Commercial banks are underwriters on 45% of tied deals and investment banks 
underwrite the remaining 55% of tied deals.  Also, commercial banks and investment banks are 
providing tied loans to similar clients.  These are interesting facts, which suggest that investment 
banks have now developed the organizational structure to lend.  The expansion into lending by 
                                                 
10 In 1994, over 30% of SEO issuers received a loan from some bank within a period of six months before and six 
months after the issuance, even though only 1.4% of these loans came from the underwriter of the issuance.   10 
investment banks is consistent with there being potential gains from a single entity offering both 
lending and underwriting services.   
 
3.1.  Equity Underwriter Spreads 
 
We wish to determine if tying lowers issuers’ financing costs.  One possibility is that the firm 
pays a lower fee to the bank for underwriting its equity offering.  An underwriter could charge a 
lower fee in a tied deal because the bank may face lower underwriting costs due to informational 
economies of scope that arise from the joint delivery of services and the reusability of 
information gathered during the lending process.  We examine differences between tied and non-
tied underwriting fees by analyzing the underwriter spread, which is the compensation paid to 
the underwriter for selling the firm’s security issue, expressed as a percent of the capital raised.  
Consistent with the existence of scope economies, the univariate descriptive statistics in Table 2, 
Panel A indicate that the average underwriter spread of tied SEOs is 78 basis points lower than 
the mean underwriter spread of non-tied SEOs, a difference that is significant at the 1% level.   
 
3.1.1.  U-shaped Underwriter Spreads 
 
The initial evidence indicates that tied issuers receive lower underwriter spreads.  We wish to see 
if this result withstands a multivariate specification.  Following Altinkilic and Hansen (2000), we 
estimate a model of the underwriter spread that can be a U-shaped function of the amount of new 
capital raised.  Theoretically, a U-shaped function could arise because fixed costs cause scale 
economies initially, but as issue size increases, diseconomies of scale arise in the spread due to 
rising placement costs.  Altinkilic and Hansen find strong evidence of U -shaped curves in a 
sample of 1,325 SEOs from 1990 through 1997.   
  As a model for the underwriter spread, we use Altinkilic and Hansen’s expanded spread 
linear model in which the underwriter spread is the sum of a fixed cost and a variable cost 
component.  In order to generate U-shaped spreads, the variable cost component must be allowed 
to rise over a relevant range of proceeds.  This condition is satisfied by dividing the SEO 
principal amount by the firm’s equity market capitalization, which holds firm size fixed as the 
size of the offering expands, thus allowing variable costs of underwriting to increase at an 
increasing rate.  We control for the volatility of equity returns because higher volatility can cause   11 
more uncertainty, which may be reflected in a higher underwriter spread.  The model captures 
any variation in underwriter costs that are due to the volume of issuance in the seasoned equity 
market.   
We extend the model to include variables to capture tied lending and prior relationships.  
Since an existing lending relationship can lower setup costs and provide the bank with access to 
additional information, tied deals involving prior lenders may be less costly.  To capture this 
potential effect, we control for interactions between prior lending and tied lending.  A negative 
coefficient on the tied lending variables would be consistent with the existence  of scope 
economies.  We estimate two variations of the expanded spread linear model – in the first model 
we do not consider differences between investment banks and commercial banks while we relax 
this restriction in the second model.  Further, we examine differences between non-investment 
grade and investment grade issuers.  Since economies of scope are likely to be high for non-
investment grade firms, we expect discounts to be concentrated amongst these deals.   
 
3.1.2.  Results 
 
Results of ordinary least squares regressions are presented in Table 3.  We find support for U-
shaped spreads.  As more capital is raised the variable cost is rising.  As expected, higher stock 
return volatility increases the variable spread and there is a large fixed cost component to 
underwriter spreads.  In the first column of Table 3, we present the results of the model in which 
we do not consider differences in the fees charged by investment banks and commercial banks.  
The coefficients on the tied lending and the prior lending variables are all negative and 
significant.  A tied loan without a prior lending relationship provides an 18 basis point reduction 
in the underwriter spread, which is significant at the 10% level.  A prior lending relationship, 
both with and without a tied loan, translates into a 36 basis point reduction in the underwriter 
spread.  On a $200 million equity offering, an 18 basis point reduction in the underwriter fee 
provides a cost savings of $360,000 to the issuer, while a 36 basis point decrease saves the issuer 
$720,000.  These results are consistent with the existence of economies of scope.   
As previously argued, economies of scope between lending and underwriting are likely to 
be pronounced when the issuer is junk rated or not rated.  We restrict the sample of SEOs to 
include only junk rated and not rated issuers and display the results of the model in the second   12 
column of Table 3.  Consistent with the existence of informational economies of scope, we find 
that amongst these issuers, significant underwriter spread discounts are provided when the issuer 
receives a tied loan or has a prior lending relationship with the underwriter.  In the third column 
of Table 3, we present the results of the model when we restrict the sample to include only 
investment grade issuers.  Amongst investment grade issuers, where private information is likely 
to be less important, we do not find significant underwriter spread discounts.  These results 
highlight that the underwriter spread discounts are driven by deals in which, ex-ante, tying is 
likely to be efficient. 
The results in the fourth and fifth columns of Table 3 show that investment banks account 
for most of the tied lending and underwriting relationship discount.  For tied issuers, investment 
banks provide a discount of 26 basis points if no prior lending relationship existed and 44 basis 
points if there is a prior lending relationship, both significant at the 5% level.  On a $200 million 
equity offering with an investment bank, on average, the issuer saves $520,000 to $880,000.  For 
commercial bank underwritten issues, the coefficients for tied deals are negative but 
insignificant.  It is interesting to note that both investment banks and commercial banks provide 
significant discounts in the underwriter spread to firms that do not receive a tied loan but with 
which a prior lending relationship is in place, which further supports the existence of 
informational economies of scope between lending and equity underwriting.   
  Overall, we find that tied deals have lower underwriter spreads than non-tied deals and 
that tied deals in which there was a prior lending relationship in place receive a larger discount.    
Importantly, we find that the discounts are driven by deals that involve junk rated and not rated 
issuers, where economies of scope between lending and underwriting are likely to be large.  
Consequently, the results are consistent with the view that tying is an efficient response to banks’ 
ability to use information across product lines.  We find additional support for the existence of 
economies of scope between lending and equity underwriting, as a prior lending relationship 
translates into an underwriter spread discount.  Further, we find that most of the underwriter 
spread discount can be attributed to investment bank underwriters. 
 
 
   13 
3.2.  The Pricing of Tied Loans 
 
We now study the pricing of tied loans to address two issues.  First, we wish to determine if 
there is additional evidence that tying reduces issuers’ financing costs.  To examine this 
question, we compare the yield spreads of tied loans and non-tied loans.
11  Lower yield spreads 
for tied loans would be consistent with the existence of informational economies of scope.  
Second, we wish to examine if the benefits provided to tied issuers vary by the type of 
underwriter.  Considering the result from the last section in which we found that investment 
banks are discounting underwriter spreads, any differences between investment bank and 
commercial bank pricing of tied loans will provide insight into how these two underwriter types 
compete.   Therefore, we compare the yield spreads of tied loans in which the lender is a 
commercial bank with tied loans from investment banks.   
 
3.2.1.  Hand Matching 
 
To examine pricing differences between tied and non-tied loans, we hand match tied l oans to 
non-tied loans on four dimensions – (i) loan origination date, (ii) industry, (iii) credit rating, and 
(iv) length of the loan.  Ideally, we would like to find a non-tied loan that matches the tied loan 
on all four dimensions.  However, it is unlikely that we will find an exact match.  Instead, for 
each of the 107 tied lending facilities in the hand-matching sample, we select the non-tied loan 
with the closest term length, given that the non-tied loan was originated between six months 
before and six months after the tied loan origination date, and the non-tied borrower belongs to 
the same industry and has the same credit rating as the tied borrower.
12  Therefore, any selected 
non-tied loan will be an exact match on two of the four dimensions (industry and credit rating) 
and will have a very similar term length and loan origination date.   
                                                 
11 The yield spread is the rate that the borrower pays to the lender (inclusive of fees), quoted in basis points over LIBOR. 
12 We also restrict the selection of non-tied loans to those that are originated between three months prior to and three 
months after the term facility origination date.  The results are similar and are not reported.  We match on the credit 
rating of the borrower at the loan origination date.  If the bank acts rationally, it should consider the effect that the 
loan will have on the credit risk of the firm when determining the price and structure of the loan.  Therefore, we also 
examine the credit rating of the firm at two quarters after the loan.  In our sample of tied loans, only two rated 
borrowers had a credit rating change during the two quarters, so both measures of credit rating provide a nearly 
identical sample.   14 
We examine the mean difference between tied and non-tied yield spreads using three 
estimators.
13  The “twelve-month estimator” uses all matches in which the absolute value of the 
difference between the term lengths of the matched pair of loans is less than 12 months.  The 
“six-month estimator” is the same as the twelve-month estimator except that the difference 
cannot exceed six months.  The “exact estimator” only includes matches where each loan in a 
matched pair has the same term length.  For all three estimators, on average, the tied loan yield 
spreads are more than 20 basis points lower than the matched non-tied loan yield spreads, a 
significant difference at the 5% level. 
 
3.2.2.  Econometric Matching 
 
There are a few problems with the hand matching method.  First, we match on only four 
dimensions and ignore variables that may be relevant in determining yield spread differences, 
such as the size of the lending facility and the type of lending facility.  Second, for matching to 
occur, there must exist at least one non-tied loan that meets these four criteria.  As a result, we do 
not generate matches for all of the tied loans in our sample.    To reduce these problems, we rely 
on econometric matching techniques that were developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and 
extended by Heckman and Robb (1986), and Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 1998).
14  In 
Appendix A, we provide a summary of these techniques and a detailed description of how we 
apply the methods to our data.   
Essentially, instead of facing the difficult task of matching directly on multiple 
dimensions, econometric matching allows us to match non-tied loans to tied loans based on a 
one-dimensional propensity score, which is a function of loans’ observable characteristics.  As a 
result, we effectively match loans based on many observable characteristics while not reducing 
the number of tied loans for which we can find matches.  Furthermore, the methods take into 
account the fact that the characteristics of tied loans may differ significantly from non-tied loans 
and ensure that such observed characteristics are not driving the results.   
                                                 
13 If multiple non-tied loans share the closest term length to the non-tied loan, we use the average yield spread of the 
non-tied loans. 
14 Previous papers in economics and finance use the Heckman et. al matching methodology.  McMillen and 
McDonald (2002) apply the method to study land valuation in a newly zoned city while Dearden, Ferri, and Meghir 
(2002) and Blundell, Dearden, Goodman, and Reed (2000) use the matching methods to study the effect of 
education on wages.  Bharath (2002) uses these methods to evaluate the agency costs of debt.     15 
We choose to use econometric matching techniques instead of the alternative approach of 
employing a multivariate regression model because matching employs fewer restrictions than the 
regression approach, and many studies have confirmed that propensity score matching methods 
can allow for a more accurate analysis (see e.g. Rubin, 1997; Conniffe et. al, 2000).  A key 
restriction in using multivariate regressions to study the pricing of loans is that the covariates are 
assumed to be linearly related to the yield spread.  In the propensity score approach, the 
researcher does not need to specify  the actual relationship between yield spreads and the 
characteristics that can affect loan pricing. 
In our models, the propensity score is a function of the firm’s credit rating, the notional 
value of the loan facility, the term length of the loan, the type of lending facility, the year of the 
facility origination, and the firm’s industry.  Using propensity scores and econometric matching 
estimators, we calculate average yield spread differences between tied loans and matched non-
tied loans.  Further, we split our sample to allow for a comparison of junk rated tied loans with 
matched junk rated non-tied loans and to enable tied loans to investment grade rated borrowers 
to be matched with non-tied loans to similar, investment grade rated borrowers.  Also, we extend 
the methodology to capture differences between commercial bank tied loans and investment 
bank tied loans.  We compare commercial bank tied loans to non-tied loans by restricting the tied 
lending sample to include only commercial bank loans.  Separately, we examine differences 
between investment bank tied loans and non-tied loans.  
     
3.2.3.  Results 
 
Each of the econometric matching estimators provides a sample of yield spread differentials, 
with each yield spread differential representing the discount (if n egative) or premium (if 
positive) that a tied lender pays.  We calculate the sample average and standard error for the 
estimations and display the results in Table 4.   
First, we provide evidence that is consistent with the existence of economies of scope in 
tied deals.  As displayed in the first column of Table 4, all estimators indicate that tied loans have 
significantly lower yield spreads, with the average discount ranging between 9.97 and 14.81 
basis points.  On a $200 million dollar, 6-year loan, a reduction of 9.97 basis points represents a   16 
present value savings of $770,000 while a 14.81 basis point reduction provides a present value 
savings of $1.15 million.
15   
We attempt to determine the effect of prior lending relationships on the yield spread 
differential between tied and non-tied loans.  For each estimator, we regress the sample of 
estimated yield spread differentials on a dummy variable that indicates if the borrower of the tied 
loan had a prior lending relationship with the bank.  Our results indicate that a prior lending 
relationship does not significantly affect the size of the discount.   
Second, we find that the lower yield spreads on tied loans are concentrated amongst 
borrowers that have lower credit quality.  The results in the second column of Table 4 show that 
yield spreads on tied loans to junk rated borrowers are discounted, on average, by between 12.10 
and 15.96 basis points relative to matched non-tied loans to junk rated borrowers, and the 
discounts are strongly significant for all four estimators.  In comparison, we find that investment 
grade borrowers do not receive significantly lower yield spreads on tied loans relative to matched 
non-tied loan yield spreads.  These results are consistent with economies of scope between 
lending and underwriting being more pronounced for issuers with lower credit ratings. 
Third, we find that commercial banks provide cheaper loans to tied borrowers.   In the 
third column of Table 4, we show that  yield spreads on commercial bank tied loans are 
discounted by between 16.35 and 22.72 basis points relative to non-tied yield spreads, and the 
differences are highly significant for all four estimators.  On a $200 million dollar, 6-year loan, a 
tied borrower earns a present value savings of between $1.27 million and $1.76 million through a 
discounted loan spread that is provided by its commercial bank.
16  Again, the savings provided 
by commercial banks are pronounced amongst junk rated borrowers.  While commercial banks 
reduce tied loan yield spreads, we find that yield spreads on investment bank tied loans are 
insignificantly different from those of non-tied loans.
17  Tying by commercial banks, as opposed 
to investment banks, largely drives the difference between the yield spreads of tied and non-tied 
loans. 
These results, in combination with the results from Section 3.1., indicate that in 
comparison to similar non-tied issuers and borrowers, tied issuers pay lower underwriter spreads 
                                                 
15 This calculation assumes a yearly discount rate of 15%. 
16 Again, this calculation assumes a yearly discount rate of 15%.   17 
on the SEO and receive lower loan yield spreads.  Furthermore, we find that the cost reductions 
are large and significant for issuers who are not investment grade rated.  These results are 
consistent with the existence of informational economies of scope.  In addition, the concentration 
of savings amongst these firms helps explain why all deals are not tied, as tying is economically 
justified only when there are sufficient informational economies of scope. 
Interestingly, we find that the form of the savings depends on the type of bank that is 
involved in the transaction, with investment banks providing lower underwriter spreads on the 
equity offering and commercial banks providing lower loan yield spreads.  These savings are 
economically substantive.  As an illustration, tied issuers who use investment banks receive an 
average savings of between $520,000 to $880,000 on a $200 million dollar equity offering.  
Those who use commercial banks receive an average saving of between $1.27 million and $1.76 
million on a $200 million dollar, 6-year loan.   
 
3.2.4.  Robustness – Simultaneous Loans 
 
An additional concern is that tied issuers are simultaneously raising equity and receiving loans 
and may therefore differ from other issuers. To address this concern, within the sample of non-
tied loans, we identify simultaneous loans, which are loans to an issuer of an SEO that are 
originated between six months prior to and six months after the SEO, where the lender could 
have been selected to underwrite the SEO but is not provided with underwriting 
responsibilities.
18  We then compare tied loan yield spreads with simultaneous loan yield spreads 
to determine if the results in Section 3.2.3. are robust.  
In Section 3.2.3., we show that most of the discounting of tied loans comes from 
commercial banks.  Hence, we compare commercial bank tied loans with commercial bank 
simultaneous loans.  Extending the previously employed methodology, we match commercial 
bank tied loans to other non-tied loans as well as commercial bank simultaneous loans to other 
non-tied loans by computing propensity scores and calculating yield spread differences. 
We compute sample averages for the tied loan matched pairs and the simultaneous loan 
matched pairs and report the mean difference in the yield spread between the two groups in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
17 In unreported estimations, we find that investment bank tied loan yield spreads are insignificantly discounted 
between zero and six basis points relative to matched non-tied loan yield spreads.     18 
fourth column of Table 4.  The results of all four estimations indicate that commercial bank tied 
loans are discounted more than commercial bank simultaneous loans.  On average, tied loan 
yield spreads are less than simultaneous loan yield spreads by 16.43 to 28.42 basis points, and 
the difference is significant when using three of the four estimators.  Relative to simultaneous 
loans, the discount that is provided by commercial banks to tied issuers remains significant.   
 
3.3.  Underwriter Relationships 
 
In Sections 3.1. and 3.2., we found that the issuers who participate in a tied deal benefit from 
lower financing costs in the form of lower underwriter spreads and lower loan yield spreads.  
Now, we examine if underwriters benefit from tying lending to underwriting.  Underwriters may 
gain if tying helps build relationships that improve the bank’s chances of capturing the current or 
future underwriting business.  Hence we first investigate if tying significantly increases the 
probability that the bank wins the current equity underwriting mandate.  Then we investigate if 
tying lending to underwriting increases the likelihood that the bank will receive future 
underwriting business from the firm, thereby increasing expected future revenues.   
 
3.3.1.  McFadden’s Choice Model 
 
In this section, we study the influence tying has on the likelihood that a bank is selected as equity 
underwriter.  We use McFadden’s (1973) choice model to capture the effect.
19 
  Each issuing firm i chooses an underwriter j from a set of J underwriters.  The choice of 
underwriter will depend on the characteristics of the issuer and attributes of the underwriter.  The 
utility of choice j is 
ij ij U e + + = ij i x ß' w a'  
where wi is a vector of issuer characteristics and xij is a matrix of choice attributes.  If the issuing 
firm makes a choice j, then we assume that Uij is the maximum among the J utilities.  Let Yi be a 
                                                                                                                                                             
18 We also extend this sample to include loans from any bank, not just those who could be selected to underwrite the 
SEO.  The results are qualitatively similar. 
19 See Greene (2000) for a discussion of models for choices between multiple alternatives.   19 
random variable that indicates the firm’s choice.  McFadden (1973) shows that if the  J 
disturbances are independent and identically distributed with Weibull distribution, then 
￿
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We assume that each firm has 21 potential choices – each of the top 20 underwriters and 
a single choice of any of the underwriters that are not ranked in the top 20.  Since the attributes 
of the potential underwriters can influence an issuer’s choice, we track underwriting 
relationships, lending relationships, analyst coverage, and all-star analyst coverage for each of 
the issuer’s potential choices.
20  By including this information, we more accurately control for 
relationship-specific and underwriter-specific factors that could affect the probability of a firm 
selecting an underwriter.  In addition, we modify our definition of “tied loans” to include loans 
from  potential underwriters that are originated between six months prior to the SEO and six 
months after the SEO.  This adjustment amounts to adding the 340 simultaneous loans to the 
sample of 358 tied loans.
21  Technically, this modification is needed because, otherwise, tied 
lending perfectly predicts an issuer’s choice of underwriter.  This methodology allows us to 
address if conditional on a firm issuing seasoned equity, lending at the time of the SEO improves 
the probability of getting the underwriting business. 
 In our models, we assume that the relevant issuer specific characteristics ( wi ) are the 
logarithm of the SEO principal amount, the age of the firm, the long-term debt to equity ratio of 
the firm in the quarter of the SEO, and the industry of the issuer.  These variables are chosen to 
control for differences between tied and non-tied issuers that are shown in Table 2, Panel A.  For 
the choice-specific attributes ( xij ), we include variables to capture tied lending, prior lending 
relationships, prior underwriting relationships, as well as the reputation of the underwriter and 
the level and quality of equity  analyst coverage.  Our priors are that prior lending and 
underwriting relationships between a firm and an underwriter will increase the probability of 
                                                 
20 For example, even though AMC Entertainment selected Goldman Sachs to underwrite its August 1998 SEO, we 
capture that it could have selected Morgan Stanley and that Morgan Stanley provided all-star analyst coverage for 
the firm.  Our final dataset consists of 48,321 firm-underwriter pairs (2301 firms X 21 choices).  
21 Since multiple underwriters can be lenders on a given lending facility, the number of underwriters that provide 
“tied loans” exceeds the total number of “tied loans.”  A total of 1154 firm-underwriter pairs have at least one loan 
that is originated between six months prior to the SEO and six months after the SEO, of which 201 underwriters are 
selected to underwrite deals.  Of the 1154 pairs, an unranked underwriter provided a loan around the equity issuance 
on 106 occasions.     20 
selection.  Also, we expect that the reputation of the underwriter and the level and quality of 
equity analyst coverage will be positively related to underwriter selection.  We estimate two 
models  – in the first model we do not consider differences between investment banks and 
commercial banks while we relax this restriction in the second model. 
 
3.3.2.  Results 
 
In  Table 5, we present the results of the underwriter selection models.  In both models, the 
control variables have the expected signs and most are highly significant.  The coefficients of the 
tied lending variables are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.  This indicates that 
after controlling for other factors that significantly influence underwriter selection, providing a 
tied loan increases the probability of winning the underwriting mandate, conditional on a firm 
issuing seasoned equity.  The effect is present for both commercial and investment bank 
underwriters.  The results demonstrate that providing a tied loan increases a bank’s expected 
investment banking revenues and raises the likelihood of building relationships with issuers. 
 
3.4.  Probability of Keeping Future Business 
 
Tying lending to underwriting may also foster a durable relationship that can boost expected 
future revenues by increasing the likelihood that the issuer will use the bank repeatedly.  Future 
interactions could become  more likely because tying allows the bank to generate private 
information that can be used in ongoing transactions with the bank, thereby providing the bank 
with a source for both lending and underwriting relationships.
22  In this section, we determine if 
tying enhances an underwriter’s ability to cultivate relationships by examining if those firms that 
participate in a tied deal go back to the market more frequently and do not switch underwriters as 
often as issuers who do not receive a tied loan. 
In Table 6, we present a univariate analysis of switching probabilities.  For our sample of 
2301 issuers, 37% of tied issuers proceed with a subsequent equity offering while only 22% of 
non-tied issuers go back to the equity market.
23  Of those firms that have a follow-up equity 
                                                 
22 Access to firm-specific information is well known to be a key factor in developing and maintaining lending 
relationships (see Ongena and Smith, 2000 for a survey of the literature).  Private information is also a key 
determinant of investment banking relationships (see e.g. Crane and Eccles, 1993). 
23 We examine subsequent SEOs that took place before March 31, 2002.  Extending the sample end date allows 
issuers from the latter part of the sample to potentially re-issue.   21 
offering, 57% of tied issuers and 45% of non-tied issuers keep the same underwriter, a 
significant difference at the 10% level.  However, there is a disparity between investment bank 
and commercial bank underwriters.  While tying significantly increases the probability of 
retaining future business for investment banks, the effect is not present for commercial banks.  
This result indicates that commercial banks may not be able to leverage their tying practices into 
extended underwriting relationships. 
 
3.4.1.  Nested Logit Model 
 
To determine if these results withstand a multivariate specification, we use a nested logit model.  
As shown in Figure 1, we assume that each issuer makes a two-stage decision.  First, the issuer 
decides if it will proceed with a subsequent SEO or if it will not issue again.  Second, if the 
issuer chooses to issue again, then it can keep the same underwriter or switch to a new 
underwriter.   
  Following Maddala (1983), let k index the first-level alternative and l index the second-
level alternative.
24  Also, let  Ykl and  Zk  be vectors of explanatory variables specific to the 
categories (k, l) and (k), respectively.  Then each issuer will have a utility Ukl for alternative (k,l) 
that is a function of the explanatory variables.  We set  kl kl e U + + = k kl Z ß' Y a' , and then the 
probability of choosing l, conditional on first choosing k is 
￿
=
= L
1 l
kl
kl
k | l
) Y (a
) Y (a
' exp
' exp
Pr . 
Define the inclusive values for category (k) as  
￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿
= ￿
=
L
l
IV
1
' exp ln ) Y (a kl k , 
which leaves us with the probability of choosing k is 
                                                 
24 For our model, k can be “Repeat” or “No-Repeat” while l can be “Switch” or  “No-Switch”   22 
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In our models, we assume that the variables that only affect the decision to re-issue ( Zk ) are the 
logarithm of the SEO principal amount, the age of the firm, the long-term debt to equity ratio of 
the firm in the quarter of the SEO, and the industry of the issuer.  For the variables that affect 
both the decision to re-issue and the decision to keep or switch underwriters ( Ykl ), we include 
variables to capture tied lending, prior lending relationships, prior underwriting relationships, as 
well as differences between the original underwriter and the subsequent underwriter in the level 
and quality of equity analyst coverage and underwriter ranking.  We expect that prior lending 
and underwriting relationships will be positively related to keeping future business.  Also, 
previous papers indicate that firms will be more likely to switch to an underwriter who has 
higher quality equity analyst coverage and is ranked above the original underwriter (see e.g. 
Krigman et. al, 2001; Fernando et. al, 2003).  As in the previous section, we estimate one model 
in which we do not consider differences between investment banks and commercial banks and a 
second model where we relax this restriction.  Based on the univariate results, we expect a 
previous tied deal w ith an investment bank underwriter to increase the probability that the 
investment bank keeps future underwriting business.  We also expect that a previous tied deal 
with a commercial bank will not significantly affect the probability that the bank can retain 
equity underwriting business in the future.  
 
3.4.2.  Results 
 
In Table 7, we present the results of the nested logit models.  The base category is that the issuer 
does not have a subsequent equity offering, so variables that are interacted with KEEP provide 
the effects of choosing to re-issue and keep the same underwriter instead of not re-issue at all.  
We also determine the effect of the variables on keeping the same underwriter instead of 
switching to a new underwriter through t-tests for differences between keeping and switching. 
In the first column of Table 7, we present the results of the model in which we do not 
consider differences between investment banks and commercial banks.  We find that a prior tied 
deal increases the probability of an issuer choosing to re-issue and keep the same lead   23 
underwriter relative to not reissuing.  The t-tests for differences between keeping and switching 
indicate that a previous tied deal also increases the probability of keeping an underwriter instead 
of switching to a new underwriter, although this result is insignificant.  Furthermore, we find that 
prior lending relationships (both with and without a tied loan) increase the probability of an 
issuer choosing the keep the same lead underwriter.  These results highlight the importance of 
lending in generating future investment banking business. 
The second column of Table 7 shows the results where we allow the coefficients to 
reflect disparities between investment banks and commercial banks.  We find that a prior tied 
deal (without the existence of a prior lending relationship) with an investment bank significantly 
increases the probability of keeping the same underwriter in the subsequent equity offering.   The 
results indicate that f or commercial bank underwriters, a tied deal does not significantly affect 
the probability that an underwriter will keep the same underwriter instead of switch to a new 
underwriter in the subsequent equity offering.  These results are consistent with the univariate 
statistics in Table 6.     
Combined with our previous findings, we find that investment banks discount 
underwriter spreads and that tying increases the probability of retaining future underwriting 
business from the firm.  Commercial banks, on the other hand, discount loan yield spreads, 
which can help establish lending relationships that are well-known to lead to other fee-based 
lending business (for some recent evidence, see Bharath et. al, 2004).  Therefore, the results are 
consistent with each type of underwriter competing more aggressively in its area of expertise and 
in the area where it is more likely to generate future business.   
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
We use a unique data set drawn from multiple data sources and augmented by hand collected 
data to examine the practice of “tying,” which occurs when a bank lends to an issuer around the 
time of a public securities offering.  We find evidence that is consistent with tying occurring 
when there are large potential efficiency gains that can arise due to informational economies of 
scope from combining lending and equity underwriting.  This is supported by the preponderance 
of tied deals involving highly leveraged and non-investment grade issuers, and the substantial 
benefits that tying brings to such issuers.  For issuers, these benefits come in the form of lower   24 
financing costs, as tied issuers receive a lower underwriter fee for the equity offering and a 
discounted yield spread on the tied loan.  The cost reductions are large and significant for issuers 
who are non-investment grade rated, where the expected informational economies of scope are 
sizeable.  Interestingly, the benefit that an issuer receives varies by the type of underwriter 
involved in the transaction.  Investment banks offer reduced underwriter spreads on tied SEOs, 
while commercial banks offer discounted loan yield spreads, which is consistent with each type 
of underwriter competing more aggressively in its area of expertise.  In addition to benefiting 
issuers, tying lending and equity underwriting produces gains for underwriters.  We find that 
providing a tied loan increases the likelihood of receiving the current equity underwriting 
business, and it also helps generate other business from the issuers, with investment bank 
underwriters more likely to receive future equity underwriting mandates from tied issuers.  These 
results are consistent with tied loans helping to build ongoing, durable relationships that increase 
an underwriter’s expected revenues.  Our finding of substantial benefits to issuers and 
underwriters from combining lending with underwriting indicates that tying is likely to continue 
in the future and that lending will remain an important factor in determining firm-underwriter 
pairings as well as influence the pricing of financial products and services.   25 
Appendix A 
Econometric Matching Methodology 
 
Econometric matching techniques were developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and 
extended by Heckman and Robb (1986), and Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 1998).  
Below, we provide a summary of their results and how we apply these methods to our data. 
  Let D=1 if the loan is a tied loan, and let D=0 if the loan is a non-tied loan.  In principle, 
the ith tied loan has its observed “tied” yield spread Y1i and another yield spread Y0i that would 
result if it were a non-tied loan.  To determine the average effect of tying on yield spreads, one 
would calculate the mean difference between Y1i and Y0i for all tied loans.  However, since we do 
not observe Y0i for our sample of tied loans, we have a missing data problem that cannot be 
solved at the level of the individual, so we reformulate the problem at the population level.  We 
focus on E(Y1 – Y0 | D=1, X), the mean effect of the difference between tied loans and non-tied 
loans with characteristics X.  While the mean E(Y1 | D=1, X) can be identified from data on tied 
loans, some assumptions must be made to identify the unobservable counterfactual mean, E(Y0 | 
D=1, X).  The observable outcome of non-tied loans E(Y0 | D=0, X) can be used to approximate 
E(Y0 | D=1, X).  The selection bias that arises from this approximation is B(X) = E(Y0 | D=1, X) - 
E(Y0 | D=0, X). 
  We use a method of matching that solves the evaluation problem.  Following Heckman 
and Robb (1986), we assume that all relevant differences between tied loans and non-tied loans 
are captured by their observable characteristics X.  Let   D | X )  , Y (Y ^ 1 0 denote the statistical 
independence of (Y0, Y 1) and D conditional on X.  Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) establish that 
when   D | X )  , Y (Y ^ 1 0  and 0 < P(D=1 | X) < 1 (which are referred to as the strong ignorability 
conditions), then  . | 1 1 0 X)  D | P(D )  , Y (Y = ^   While it is often difficult to match on high 
dimension X, this result allows us to match based on the one-dimensional P(D=1 | X) alone.  
P(D=1 | X), known as the propensity score, can be estimated using probit or logit models.  
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998) extend this result by showing that the strong ignorability 
conditions are overly restrictive for the estimation of E(Y1 – Y 0 | D=1, X).  Instead, a weaker 
mean independence condition E(Y0 | D=1, P(D=1 | X)) = E(Y0 | D=0, P(D=1 | X)) is all that is 
required.
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  To implement econometric matching, we compute propensity scores for each of the tied 
loans and non-tied loans.  There may be loans that have propensity scores that are outside of the 
common support of tied loan and non-tied loan propensity scores.  Using loans that fall outside 
of the common support can substantially bias the results (see e.g. Heckman et. al 1997).  As a 
result, we remove all loans that are outside of the common propensity score support. 
We use two classes of propensity score matching estimators: (i) nearest neighbor 
matching, and (ii) kernel based matching.
25   Let Y1i be the yield spread of a tied loan, Y0j be the 
yield spread of a non-tied loan, and let 
z
i Y 0  represent the (weighted) average of yield spreads of 
the non-tied loans using estimator z that is matched with Y1i.   We compute the sample average of 
yield spread differences  . 0 1
z
i i Y Y -  
For each tied loan, the nearest neighbor matching estimator chooses the n non-tied loans 
with closest propensity scores to the tied loan propensity score.  The estimator computes the 
arithmetic average of the yield spreads of these n non-tied loans.  For each Y1i, we match  
￿
˛
=
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0 0
1
i N j
j
NN
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n
Y  
where N(i) is the set of non-tied loans that are nearest neighbors.  We set n = 10 and n = 50. 
The kernel estimators construct matches for each tied loan by using weighted averages of 
yield spreads of multiple non-tied loans.  If weights from a typical symmetric, non negative, 
unimodal kernel K(• ) are used, then the kernel places higher weight on loans close in terms of 
P(D=1 | X) and lower or zero weight on more distant observations.  Let 
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where h is a fixed bandwidth and P(X) = P(D=1 | X).  For each Y1i, we match a corresponding 
K
i Y 0  where 
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25 The propensity score matching methods are discussed in greater detail in Heckman et. al (1997, 1998)   27 
We use two different kernels to compute 
K
i Y 0 .  The Gaussian kernel uses all non-tied loans while 
the Epanechnikov kernel only uses non-tied loans with a propensity score P(X0j) that falls within 
the fixed bandwidth h of P(X1i).  We set h = 0.01.  As a robustness check, we also tried different 
values of h and obtained similar results. 
To determine if econometric matching is a viable method of evaluation, Heckman et. al  
identify four features of the data and matching techniques that can substantially reduce bias – (i) 
Participants and controls have the same distributions of unobserved attributes; (ii) They have the 
same distributions of observed attributes; (iii) Outcomes and characteristics are measured in the 
same way for both groups; and (iv) Participants and controls are from the same economic 
environment.  Items (iii) and (iv) are met very well for this study because the loan yield spreads 
and other loan characteristics are measured in the same way for both tied and non-tied loans, and 
the non-tied loans are from the same time period as the tied loans.  To satisfy condition (ii), we 
use loan characteristics to match tied loans to non-tied loans.  Feature (i) cannot be achieved in a 
non-experimental evaluation.  However, Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) note that feature 
(i) is only a small part of bias in their experimental study.  Thus, the method of matching non-
tied loans to tied loans can produce a viable estimate of the difference between non-tied loan and 
tied loan yield spreads.   28 
Appendix B 
Detailed Descriptions of the Variables 
 
Underwriter Spread Regressions (Section 3.1.) 
USPREAD: The underwriter spread, which is the compensation paid to the underwriter for selling  the firm’s 
   Security issue, expressed as a percent of the capital raised 
TIELOAN: A dummy variable that equals one if the underwriter provided a loan to the issuer between six months 
  prior to the SEO and six months after the SEO and the underwriter had never provided a loan to the issuer 
  in the past 
TIEPLEND: A dummy variable that equals one if the underwriter provided a loan to the issuer between six months 
  prior to the SEO and six months after the SEO and the underwriter provided a loan to the issuer prior to six 
  months before the SEO 
PRIORLEND: A dummy variable that equals one if a loan between the underwriter and the issuer was 
  originated at any time prior to six months before the SEO and the underwriter does not provide a loan to 
  the issuer between six months prior to the SEO and six months after the SEO   
PRIORUND: A dummy variable that equals one if the underwriter had been the underwriter on any prior equity 
  offering by the issuer 
IB: A dummy variable that equals one if the parent/holding company of the underwriter at the time of the issue is an 
  investment bank 
CB: A dummy variable that equals one if the parent/holding company of the underwriter at the time of the issue is an 
  commercial bank 
(1/SEOSIZE): The inverse of the principal amount of the offering, in millions of dollars.  This variable captures the 
  fixed cost component of underwriter spreads 
(SEOSIZE / MKTCAP) : The principal amount of the offering divided by the market capitalization of the issuer at 
  the date of the SEO.  This variable captures the variable cost component of underwriting spreads 
VOL: The daily standard deviation of the issuer’s common stock rate of return over the 220 trading days ending 40 
  days before the offering 
MKTACT: The dollar volume of issuance by non-SIC6 firms in the US seasoned equity market during the three 
  months prior to the SEO date 
 
Propensity Score / Estimating Yield Spread Differences (Section 3.2.) 
YSPREAD: The yield spread of the loan, measured as the rate the borrower pays to the lender, quoted in basis 
  points over LIBOR.  We use the DealScan item “all-in spread drawn,” which adds the spread of the loan 
  with any fees that have to be paid back to the bank.   
TIED: A dummy variable that equals one if the lending facility is a tied loan and zero if the loan is a non-tied loan 
SIMULTANEOUS: A dummy variable that equals one if the lending facility is a simultaneous loan and zero if the 
  loan is a non-simultaneous loan 
RATING: A variable that provides the Standard & Poor’s credit rating of the firm at the date of the lending facility.  
  Each rating is given a numerical counterpart: AAA = 1, AA = 2, A = 3, BBB =   4, BB = 5, B = 6, CCC = 
  7, CC = 8, C = 9 
FACSIZE: The notional value of the loan facility between the lender and the borrower, expressed in millions of 
  dollars 
LENGTH: The term length of the loan, measured as the difference between the term facility active date and the term 
  facility expiration date, measured in months 
TYPE: Dummy variables that correspond to the type of lending facility.  The dummy variables indicate if the facility 
  is a term loan, 364-day facility, revolving line of credit, or other type 
YEAR: Dummy variables that correspond to the year of the origination date of the lending facility 
INDUSTRY: Dummy variables that equal one if the borrower is in the corresponding two-digit SIC group 
 
McFadden Choice Model / Underwriter Relationships (Section 3.3.) 
TIELOAN: A dummy variable that equals one if a potential underwriter provided a loan to the issuer between six 
  months prior to the SEO and six months after the SEO and the potential underwriter had never provided a 
  loan to the issuer in the past 
TIEPLEND: A dummy variable that equals one if the potential underwriter provided a loan to the issuer between six 
  months prior to the SEO and six months after the SEO and the potential underwriter provided a loan to the 
  issuer prior to six months before the SEO   29 
PRIORLEND: A dummy variable that equals one if a loan between the potential underwriter and   the issuer was 
  originated at any time prior to six months before the SEO and the potential underwriter does not provide a 
  loan to the issuer between six months prior to the SEO and six months after the SEO   
PRIORUND: A dummy variable that equals one if the potential underwriter had been the underwriter on any 
  prior equity offering by the issuer 
COVERAGE: A dummy variable that is one if the potential underwriter provided an earnings per share estimate for 
  the firm during the year prior to the SEO 
ALLSTAR: A dummy variable that is one if COVERAGE is one and the analyst was ranked as an all-star by 
  Institutional Investor magazine for the year prior to the SEO 
RANK: We compute each underwriter’s yearly SEO market share by adding the principal amounts of all SEOs in 
  which the bank was an underwriter and dividing this total by the principal amounts of all SEOs during the 
  year.  To avoid potential simultaneity problems, we rank the underwriters on a yearly basis, based on the 
  market share in the previous year.  If a merger between underwriters occurred during the year, we use the 
  combined market share of the underwriters.  The top-ranked underwriter is given a score of 20, the second-
  ranked underwriter is 19, and so on.  Underwriters not ranked in the top 20 are given a score of zero 
 
Nested Logit Model / Keeping Future Business (Section 3.4.) 
TIELOAN: A dummy variable that equals one if the underwriter provided a loan to the issuer between six months 
  prior to the original SEO and six months after the original SEO and the  underwriter had never provided a 
  loan to the issuer in the past 
TIEPLEND: A dummy variable that equals one if the underwriter provided a loan to the issuer between six months 
  prior to the original SEO and six months after the original SEO and the underwriter provided a loan to the 
  issuer prior to six months before the original SEO 
PRIORLEND: A dummy variable that equals one if a loan between the underwriter and the issuer was 
  originated at any time prior to six months before the original SEO and the underwriter does not provide a 
  loan to the issuer between six months prior to the original SEO and six months after the   original SEO   
PRIORUND: A dummy variable that equals one if the underwriter had been the underwriter on any equity offering 
  prior to the original SEO by the issuer 
REPEAT: A dummy variable that is one if the issuer has a subsequent offering 
KEEP: A dummy variable that is one if the issuer keeps the same underwriter in the subsequent offering 
SWITCH: A dummy variable that is one if the issuer switches underwriters in the subsequent offering 
CNGCOV: For “switchers,” the difference between the coverage provided by the new underwriter and the original 
  underwriter during the year prior to the subsequent SEO.  The variable can take on the values of –1, 0, or 1.  
  By definition, for all non-repeaters and keepers, it has a value of zero 
CNGSTAR: For “switchers,” the difference between the all-star coverage provided by the new underwriter and the 
  original underwriter during the year prior to the subsequent SEO.  The variable can take on the values of 
   –1, 0, or 1.  By definition, for all non-repeaters and keepers, it has a value of zero 
CNGRANK: For “switchers,” the difference between the subsequent underwriter’s ranking in the year before the 
  subsequent issue date and the original underwriter’s ranking in the year before the subsequent issue date.  
  For keepers and non-repeaters, the variable is zero 
IB: A dummy variable that equals one if the parent/holding company of the potential underwriter at the time of the 
  issue is an investment bank 
CB: A dummy variable that equals one if the parent/holding company of the potential underwriter at the time of the 
  issue is an commercial bank 
 
Control Variables 
LNSIZE: The logarithm of the principal amount of the offering 
DE-LTDEBT: The long-term debt to equity ratio in the quarter of the SEO 
AGE: The firm’s age, measured as the difference between the SEO date and the incorporation date, expressed in 
  years 
SICx: Dummy variables that equal one if the issuer is in the corresponding one-digit SIC group 
IGRADE: A dummy variable that equals one if the issuer is rated AAA, AA, A, or BBB in the quarter of the SEO 
  by Standard & Poor’s 
JUNK: A dummy variable that equals one if the issuer is rated BB, B, CCC, CC, or C in the quarter of the SEO by 
  Standard & Poor’s   30 
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Table 1 
Tied Deals, by year 
This table presents the percentage of SEOs that are tied deals.  A tied deal is any SEO in which the underwriter provides a loan to the 
issuer between six months prior to the SEO and six months after the SEO.  
 
Year  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001* 
Number of SEOs  363  493  596  515  340  389  375  86 
Number of Tied Deals  5  5  19  48  37  52  27  18 
% Tied Deals  1.38%  1.01%  3.19%  9.32%  10.88%  13.37%  7.20%  20.93% 
 
* Through May 31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Univariate Tests for Differences in the Sample of SEOs between Jan. 1996 and May 2001 
This table tests for differences between tied deals and non-tied deals and for differences between investment bank tied deals and 
commercial bank tied deals.  Panels A and C use a difference in means t-test and Wilcoxon rank test.  A tied deal is any SEO in 
which the underwriter provided a loan to the issuer between six months prior to the SEO and six months after the SEO.  The 
underwriter is an IB (CB) if the parent or holding company of the underwriter is an investment bank (commercial bank) at the time 
of the SEO.  The variables are defined as follows:  USPREAD is the underwriter spread, which is compensation paid to the 
underwriter for selling the firm’s security issue, expressed as a percent of the capital raised.  LNSIZE is the logarithm of the SEO 
principal amount, expressed in millions of dollars.  DE-LTDEBT is the long-term debt to common equity ratio in the quarter of the 
SEO.  AGE is the firm’s age, measured as the difference between the date of the SEO and the incorporation date, measured in years.  
PRIORLEND is one if a loan between underwriter and the issuer was originated at any time before six months prior to the SEO.  
PRIORUND is one if the underwriter had been the underwriter on any prior equity offering by the issuer.  COVERAGE is one if the 
underwriter had provided an earnings per share estimate for the firm within the year prior to the SEO.   ALLSTAR is one if 
COVERAGE is one and the analyst was ranked as an all-star by Institutional Investor magazine for the year prior to the SEO.  A 
firm has an issuer rating of IGRADE if it is rated AAA, AA, A, or BBB by Standard & Poor’s in the quarter of the SEO.  A firm has 
an issuer rating of JUNK if it is rated BB, B, CCC, CC, or C by Standard & Poor’s in the quarter of the SEO. 
 
 
Panel A: Tied vs. Non-Tied Deals – Issuer and Issuance Variables 
 
Variable 
Tied Deal  
Mean 
Non-Tied  
Deal Mean 
 
T-ratio 
Wilcoxon test 
p-value 
USPREAD    4.33    5.11     -8.63   ***    0.0000     *** 
LNSIZE    5.09    4.28    9.94   ***    0.0000     *** 
DE-LTDEBT    2.57    0.55    2.96   ***    0.0000     *** 
AGE    21.78    17.87    2.12   **    0.1845 
Panel B: Tied vs. Non-Tied Deals – Relationship Variables 
Variable  Percent of Tied Deals  Percent of Non-Tied Deals   
CB  45.3  28.1   
IB  54.7  71.9   
PRIORLEND  41.3    4.9   
PRIORUND  44.8  39.5   
COVERAGE  77.1  63.0   
ALLSTAR  21.4  12.9   
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
 
 
Panel C: IB vs. CB Tied Deals – Issuer and Issuance Variables 
 
Variable 
 
IB Tied Deal Mean 
 
CB Tied Deal Mean 
 
T-ratio 
Wilcoxon test 
 p-value 
USPREAD     4.25     4.43    0.98    0.2792 
LNSIZE     5.28     4.92    2.24  **    0.0110  ** 
DE-LTDEBT     2.83     2.31    0.39    0.4189 
AGE     20.50     23.35    0.79    0.1148 
Panel D: IB vs. CB Tied Deals – Relationship Variables 
Variable  Percent of IB Tied Deals  Percent of CB Tied Deals   
PRIORLEND  36.4  47.3   
PRIORUND  48.2  40.7   
COVERAGE  78.2  75.8   
ALLSTAR  23.6  18.7   
Panel E: IB vs. CB Tied Deals – Issuer Rating 
Variable  Percent of IB Tied Deals  Percent of CB Tied Deals   
IGRADE    17.27    13.19   
JUNK    70.91    60.44   
 
*** indicates significantly different than zero at the 1% level (2-sided) 
** indicates significantly different than zero at the 5% level (2-sided) 
* indicates significantly different than zero at the 10% level (2-sided) 
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Table 3 
Underwriter Spread Regressions 
This table provides ordinary least squares estimates of a model of the underwriter spread that can be a U-shaped function of the amount of new capital raised.  The 
model is based on Altinkilic and Hansen’s (2000) expanded spread linear model.  The dependent variable is USPREAD, which is the compensation paid to the 
underwriter for selling the firm’s security issue, expressed as a percentage of the principal amount.  The independent variables are: TIELOAN is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the underwriter provided a loan to the issuer between six months prior to the SEO and six months after the SEO and the underwriter had never 
provided a loan to the issuer in the past.  TIEPLEND is a dummy variable that equals one if the underwriter provided a loan to the issuer between six months prior 
to the SEO and six months after the SEO and the underwriter provided a loan to the issuer prior to six months before the SEO.  PRIORLEND is a dummy variable 
that equals one if a loan between the underwriter and the issuer was originated at any time prior to six months before the SEO and the underwriter does not provide 
a loan to the issuer between six months prior to the SEO and six months after the SEO.  PRIORUND is one if the underwriter had been the underwriter on any prior 
equity offering by the issuer.  IB (CB) is one if the parent / holding company of the underwriter is an investment bank (commercial bank).  To capture the fixed cost 
component of spreads, we include (1/SEOSIZE), the inverse of the principal amount of the equity offering, measured in millions of dollars.  Variable costs are 
captured by (SEOSIZE / MKTCAP), the principal amount of the offering divided by the market capitalization of the issuer at the date of the SEO.  VOL is the daily 
standard deviation of the issuer’s common stock rate of return over the 220 trading days ending 40 days before the offering.  MKTACT is the dollar volume of 
issuance in the US SEO market for the three months prior to each offering.  SICx are industry dummy variables, which are one if the firm has the corresponding 
one-digit SIC.  In columns (1) and (4), we estimate the models using the full sample of issues.  In columns (2) and (5), the sample is restricted to SEOs by non-
investment grade issuers.  Non-investment grade issuers are either not rated or have a Standard & Poor’s long term debt rating of BB, B, CCC, or CC in the quarter 
of the SEO.  In columns (3) and (6), the sample is restricted to SEOs by investment grade issuers.  Investment grade issuers have a Standard & Poor’s long term debt 
rating of AAA, AA, A, or BBB in the quarter of the SEO.  Coefficients for the industry variables (SICx) are not reported.  T-ratios are in parentheses.  
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  Full Sample 
(1) 
Non-Investment Grade 
(2) 
Investment Grade 
(3) 
Full Sample 
(4) 
Non-Investment Grade 
(5) 
Investment Grade 
(6) 
Intercept    4.247  *** 
(33.12) 
    4.599  *** 
(35.74) 
    3.439  *** 
(7.38) 
    4.231  *** 
(31.57) 
    4.565  *** 
(34.28) 
    3.185  *** 
(5.64) 
TIELOAN    -0.182  * 
(-1.74) 
    -0.179  * 
(-1.76) 
    -0.034 
(-0.11) 
           
TIEPLEND    -0.360  ** 
(-2.31) 
    -0.329  ** 
(-2.26) 
    -0.474 
(-1.02) 
           
PRIORLEND    -0.360  *** 
(-3.04) 
    -0.358  *** 
(-3.17) 
    -0.069 
(-0.23) 
           
PRIORUND    -0.217  *** 
(-4.19) 
    -0.263  *** 
(-5.19) 
    -0.028 
(-0.17) 
           
IB                0.021 
(0.29) 
 
    0.043 
(0.64) 
    0.238 
(0.67) 
IB X TIELOAN                -0.263  ** 
(-2.00) 
 
    -0.343  ** 
(-2.40) 
    0.303 
(0.92) 
CB X TIELOAN                -0.070 
(-0.43) 
 
    0.022 
(0.17) 
    -0.760 
(-1.61) 
IB X TIEPLEND                -0.440  ** 
(-2.20) 
 
    -0.413  ** 
(-2.44) 
    -1.382 
(-1.55) 
CB X TIEPLEND                -0.321 
(-1.43) 
 
    -0.283 
(-1.27) 
    0.003 
(0.00) 
IB X PRIORLEND                -0.324  ** 
(-2.49) 
 
    -0.328  *** 
(-2.67) 
    0.046 
(0.15) 
CB X PRIORLEND                -0.454  * 
(-1.81) 
 
    -0.427  * 
(-1.84) 
    -0.441 
(-0.48) 
IB X PRIORUND                -0.248  *** 
(-4.39) 
 
    -0.299  *** 
(-5.29) 
    -0.122 
(-0.72) 
CB X PRIORUND                -0.135 
(-1.45) 
 
    -0.173  ** 
(-2.02) 
    0.178 
(0.42) 
1 / SEOSIZE    17.270  *** 
(6.04) 
    15.377  *** 
(5.99) 
    24.680  *** 
(2.91) 
    17.259  *** 
(5.98) 
    15.328  *** 
(5.92) 
    24.783  *** 
(2.74) 
SEOSIZE / MKTCAP    0.242 
(1.43) 
    0.225 
(1.13) 
    -0.049 
(-0.37) 
    0.241 
(1.42) 
    0.223 
(1.12) 
    -0.052 
(-0.39) 
VOL    12.274  *** 
(10.26) 
    7.570  *** 
(6.73) 
    17.273 
(1.57) 
    12.226  *** 
(9.96) 
    7.532  *** 
(6.55) 
    18.625  * 
(1.73) 
MKTACT    -7.581  ** 
(-2.34) 
    -4.071 
(-1.44) 
    -2.042 
(-1.38) 
    -7.652  ** 
(-2.36) 
    -3.957 
(-1.42) 
 
    -2.173 
(-1.49) 
R-Squared  0.4029    0.4003    0.1644    0.4040    0.4026    0.2048 
*** indicates significantly different than zero at the 1% level (2-sided) 
** indicates significantly different than zero at the 5% level (2-sided) 
* indicates significantly different than zero at the 10% level (2-sided) 
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Table 4 
Estimated Yield Spread Differences, in basis points 
This table provides estimates of the mean difference between the yield spread (YSPREAD) of (a) Tied loans and non-tied loans, (b) CB tied 
loans and non-tied loans, and (c) CB tied loans and CB simultaneous loans, using various estimators.  YSPREAD is the yield spread – the 
rate that the borrower pays to the lender (inclusive of fees), quoted in basis points over LIBOR.  Tied (Simultaneous) loans are loans to the 
issuer of an SEO between six months prior to and six months after the SEO where the lender is (not, but could have been selected as) the 
underwriter of the SEO.  To examine mean yield spread differences, w e control for six characteristics – (i) Credit rating  (ii) Lending 
facility size (iii) Length of the loan (iv) Type of lending facility (v) Loan origination date and (vi) Industry.  We compute propensity scores 
using the following probit model:  
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TIED is a dummy variable that equals one if the lending facility is a tied loan and zero if the loan is a non-tied loan.  RATING provides the 
Standard & Poor’s credit rating of a firm at the date of the loan.  Each rating is given a numerical counterpart: AAA = 1, AA = 2, A = 3, 
BBB = 4, BB = 5, B = 6, CCC = 7, CC = 8, C = 9.  FACSIZE is the notional value of the loan facility between the lender and the borrower, 
expressed in millions of dollars.  LENGTH is the difference between the term facility active date and the term facility expiration date, 
measured in months.  TYPE stands for a set of dummy variables based on the type of lending facility, as classified by LPC Dealscan.  Each 
facility is classified as “term loan,” “revolving line of credit,” “364 day facility,” or “other type,” and we create four corresponding dummy 
variables.  YEAR stands for a set of dummy variables based on the loan origination date of the lending facility.  For this sample, we define 
six dummy variables, one for each year between 1996 and 2001.  INDUSTRY stands for a set of industry dummy variables based on two-
digit primary SIC code.  The estimators, which are described in detail in Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 1998), are defined as 
follows: NEAR NEIGHBOR chooses for each tied loan, the n non-tied loans with closest propensity scores, and uses the arithmetic average 
of the n non-tied yield spreads.  We use n = 10 and n = 50.  GAUSSIAN and EPANECHNIKOV use a weighted average of non-tied loans, 
with more weight given to non-tied loans with propensity score that are closer to the tied loan propensity score.  GAUSSIAN uses all non-
tied loans, while for EPANECHNIKOV, we specify a propensity score bandwidth (h) that limits the sample of non-tied loans.  We specify 
that h = 0.01.   
 
In column (1), we compute yield spread differences between tied loans and non-tied loans by using the estimators to match tied loans to 
non-tied loans.  In column (2), we compute yield spread differences between junk rated tied loans and non-tied loans by removing all 
investment grade-rated loans from the sample, computing propensity scores, and using the estimators to find non-tied loan matches for each 
junk rated tied loan.  In column (3), we compute yield spread differences between CB tied loans and non-tied loans by removing IB tied 
loans from the sample, computing propensity scores, and using the estimators to find non-tied loan matches for CB tied loans.  In column 
(4), we compute yield spread differences between CB tied and CB simultaneous loans.  We remove all simultaneous loans and IB tied loans 
from the sample, compute propensity scores, match non-tied loans to each CB tied loan, and compute yield spread differences.   Then, we 
remove all tied loans and IB simultaneous loans from the sample and compute propensity scores using the above probit model by replacing 
TIED with SIMULTANEOUS, which is one if the loan is simultaneous and zero if it is non-simultaneous.  We use the estimators to find 
matches and compute yield spread differences for each CB simultaneous loan. We examine the difference between CB tied yield spread 
differences and CB simultaneous yield spread differences.  For all estimations, we present the sample averages.  We report t-ratios in 
parentheses, which are calculated using standard errors that are computed by bootstrapping with 50 replications. 
 
 
Estimator 
 
Mean Yield Spread 
Difference between 
Tied and Non-Tied  
(1) 
  Mean Yield Spread 
Difference between  
Junk Rated Tied 
and Non-Tied  
(2)   
Mean Yield Spread 
Difference between  
CB Tied and 
 Non-Tied 
(3)    
Mean Yield Spread 
Difference between 
CB Tied and CB 
Simultaneous 
(4)  
NEAR NEIGHBOR 
(n=10) 
 
  -14.811 ** 
(-2.09) 
    -13.690 ** 
(-2.23) 
    -22.713 ** 
(-2.38)   
  -28.422 * 
(-1.92) 
NEAR NEIGHBOR 
(n=50) 
 
  -12.081 ** 
(-2.38) 
    -12.104 ** 
(-2.24) 
    -19.052 ** 
(-2.31)   
  -28.202 ** 
(-1.96) 
GAUSSIAN 
 
 
   -9.966  * 
(-1.93) 
    -13.041 ** 
(-2.38) 
    -16.347 ** 
(-2.23)   
  -16.430 
(-1.12) 
EPANECHNIKOV 
 
 
  -14.772 ** 
(-2.27) 
    -15.959 ** 
(-2.06) 
    -21.223 ** 
(-2.57)   
  -26.409 * 
(-1.83) 
*** indicates significantly different than zero at the 1% level (2-sided) 
** indicates significantly different than zero at the 5% level (2-sided) 
* indicates significantly different than zero at the 10% level (2-sided)   38 
 
Table 5 
Multivariate Model of Underwriter Selection (McFadden’s Choice Model) 
Each issuing firm i chooses an underwriter j from a set of J underwriters.  The utility of choice j is  
ij ij U e + + = ij x ß' i w a'  
where wi is a vector of issuer characteristics and xij is a matrix of choice attributes.  If the issuing firm makes a choice j, then we assume that 
Uij is the maximum among the J utilities.  The relevant issuer specific characteristics are wi = {LNSIZE, AGE, DE-LTDEBT, SICx}.  We 
use two different specifications for xij.  In column (1), we do not consider differences between investment banks and commercial banks.  
We specify that  xij = {TIELOAN, TIEPLEND, PRIORLEND, PRIORUND, COVERAGE, ALLSTAR, RANK1, . . ., RANK20}.  In 
column (2), we allow for differences between investment banks and commercial banks by setting  xij = {IB X TIELOAN, CB X TIELOAN, 
IB X TIEPLEND, CB X TIEPLEND, IB X PRIORLEND, CB X PRIORLEND, IB X PRIORUND, CB X PRIORUND, IB, COVERAGE, 
ALLSTAR, RANK1, . . ., RANK20}.  The issuer characteristics are defined as follows: LNSIZE is the logarithm of the SEO principal 
amount, expressed in millions of dollars.  AGE is the firm’s age, measured as the difference between the date of the SEO and the 
incorporation date, measured in years.  DE-LTDEBT is the long-term debt to common equity ratio in the quarter of the SEO.  SICx are 
industry dummy variables, which are one if the firm has the corresponding one-digit SIC.  The choice attributes are defined as follows: 
TIELOAN is a dummy variable that equals one if a potential underwriter provided a loan to the issuer between six months prior to the SEO 
and six months after the SEO and the potential underwriter had never provided a loan to the issuer in the past.  TIEPLEND is a dummy 
variable that equals one if a potential underwriter provided a loan to the issuer between six months prior to the SEO and six months after the 
SEO and the potential underwriter provided a loan to the issuer prior to six months before the SEO.  PRIORLEND is a dummy variable that 
equals one if a loan between the potential underwriter and the issuer was originated at any time prior to six months before the SEO and the 
potential underwriter does not provide a loan to the issuer between six months prior to the SEO and six months after the SEO.  PRIORUND 
is one if a potential underwriter had been the underwriter on any prior equity offering by the issuer.  IB (CB) is one if the potential 
underwriter of the SEO is an investment bank (commercial bank).    COVERAGE is one if the potential underwriter had provided an 
earnings per share estimate for the firm during the year prior to the SEO.   ALLSTAR is one if COVERAGE is one and the analyst was 
ranked as an all-star by Institutional Investor magazine for the year prior to the SEO.  RANK1 through RANK20 are 20 dummy variables, 
one for each potential choice.  The issuer characteristics are interacted with the 20 choice-specific dummy variables in order to be included 
in the model. Estimated coefficients for the choice specific constants and the issuer characteristics are not reported.  
 
  (1)         (2) 
  Coefficient  T-ratio    Coefficient  T-ratio 
TIELOAN  1.945     10.34  ***       
TIEPLEND  1.385    6.51  ***       
PRIORLEND  0.513    3.29  ***       
PRIORUND  2.698    37.46  ***       
IB X TIELOAN        2.106    8.54  *** 
CB X TIELOAN        1.699    6.51  *** 
IB X TIEPLEND        1.867    5.59  *** 
CB X TIEPLEND        1.188    4.75  *** 
IB X PRIORLEND        0.874    4.36  *** 
CB X PRIORLEND        0.104    0.43 
IB X PRIORUND         2.881    33.60  *** 
CB X PRIORUND        2.197    15.50  *** 
IB          -0.176    -1.89  * 
COVERAGE  1.601    19.90  ***    1.640    20.26  *** 
ALLSTAR  0.561    4.76  ***    0.535    4.52  *** 
 
Psuedo R-squared  0.4161 
 
 
0.4187 
Log Likelihood  3398.72    3383.64 
 
*** indicates significantly different than zero at the 1% level (2-sided) 
** indicates significantly different than zero at the 5% level (2-sided) 
* indicates significantly different than zero at the 10% level (2-sided)   39 
Table 6 
Univariate Analysis of Keeping the Same Underwriter in a Subsequent SEO 
This table summarizes the probability that an issuer will proceed with a subsequent SEO and, if so, the probability that the issuer will 
keep the underwriter, based on if the initial SEO was a tied deal.   A tied deal is any SEO in which the underwriter provided a loan to 
the issuer between six months prior to the SEO and six months after the SEO.  The underwriter is an IB (CB) if the parent or holding 
company of the underwriter is an investment bank (commercial bank) at the time of the SEO.  Panel A provides a full sample 
analysis.  Panel B examines those SEOs in which the underwriter was an investment bank.  Panel C examines those SEOs in which 
the underwriter is a commercial bank.  P-values for the difference in proportions is provided in the last column.  
  
   Tied Deals  Non-Tied Deals 
Proportion test  
p-value 
 
PANEL A: Full Sample   
# in Sample    201    2100   
# that Repeat    74    462   
% of Sample that Repeat    36.82%    22.00%    0.0000  *** 
# Keep Same Underwriter    42    207   
% of Repeaters that Keep Same Underwriter        56.76%    44.81%    0.0556  * 
 
 
PANEL B: Underwriter is an IB       
 
# in Sample    110    1509   
# that Repeat    43    347   
% of Sample that Repeat    39.09%    23.00%    0.0001  *** 
# Keep Same Underwriter    28    148   
% of Repeaters that Keep Same Underwriter        65.12%    42.65%    0.0049  *** 
 
 
PANEL C: Underwriter is a CB       
 
# in Sample    91    591   
# that Repeat    31    115   
% of Sample that Repeat    34.07%    19.46%    0.0018  *** 
# Keep Same Underwriter    14    59   
% of Repeaters that Keep Same Underwriter        45.16%    51.30%    0.5162 
 
*** indicates significantly different than zero at the 1% level (2-sided) 
** indicates significantly different than zero at the 5% level (2-sided) 
* indicates significantly different than zero at the 10% level (2-sided) 
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Table 7 
Multivariate Model of Keeping the Same Underwriter in a Subsequent SEO 
In this table, we present results of two nested logit models of the probability of keeping or switching underwriters in a subsequent SEO.  Let 
the alternatives of “Repeat” and “Not Repeat” belong to category k and the alternatives of “Keep” and “Switch” belong to category l.  We 
define Ykl and Zk be vectors of explanatory variables specific to the categories (k, l) and (k), respectively.  The utility of choosing alternative 
(k,l) is  
kl e kl U + + = k Z ß' kl Y a'  
 
We specify that Zk = {LNSIZE, AGE, DE-LTDEBT, SICx}.  In column (1), we do not consider differences between investment banks and 
commercial banks by specifying that Ykl = {TIELOAN, TIEPLEND, PRIORLEND, PRIORUND, CNGCOV, CNGSTAR, CNGRANK, 
KEEP, SWITCH}.  In column (2), we allow for differences between investment banks and commercial banks by setting Ykl = {IB X 
TIELOAN, CB X TIELOAN, IB X TIEPLEND, CB X TIEPLEND, IB X PRIORLEND, CB X PRIORLEND, IB X PRIORUND, CB X 
PRIORUND, IB, CNGCOV, CNGSTAR, CNGRANK, KEEP, SWITCH}.  The variables in Zk  are defined as follows: LNSIZE is the 
logarithm of the original SEO principal amount, expressed in millions of dollars.  AGE is the firm’s age, measured as the difference 
between the date of the original SEO and the incorporation date, measured in years.  DE-LTDEBT is the long-term debt to common equity 
ratio in the quarter of the original SEO.  SICx are industry dummy variables, which are one if the firm has the corresponding one-digit SIC.  
The variables in Ykl are: TIELOAN is a dummy variable that equals one if the underwriter provided a loan to the issuer between six months 
prior to the SEO and six months after the SEO and the underwriter had never provided a loan to the issuer in the past.  TIEPLEND is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the underwriter provided a loan to the issuer between six months prior to the original SEO and six 
months after the original SEO and the underwriter provided a loan to the issuer prior to six months before the SEO.  PRIORLEND is a 
dummy variable that equals one if a loan between the underwriter and the issuer was originated at any time prior to six months before the 
SEO and the underwriter does not provide a loan to the issuer between six months prior to the SEO and six months after the SEO.  
PRIORUND is one if the underwriter had been the underwriter on any equity offering by the issuer prior to the original SEO.  IB is one if 
the underwriter of the original SEO is an investment bank.    CB is one if the underwriter of the original SEO is a commercial bank.  
CNGCOV is the difference between the coverage provided by the subsequent underwriter and the original underwriter in the year prior to 
the subsequent SEO.  CNGSTAR is the difference between the all-star coverage provided by the subsequent underwriter and the original 
underwriter in the year prior to the subsequent SEO.  CNGRANK is the difference between the subsequent underwriter’s ranking in the year 
before the subsequent issue date and the original underwriter’s ranking in the year before the subsequent issue date.  KEEP and SWITCH 
are choice-specific dummy variables.  TIELOAN, PRIORUND, PRIORLEND, and IB are interacted with KEEP and SWITCH in order to 
be included in the model. LNSIZE, AGE, DE-LTDEBT, and SICx are interacted with REPEAT in order to be included in the model.  
Estimated coefficients for the industry variables (SICx) are not reported. 
 
  (1)  (2) 
  Coefficient  T-ratio    Coefficient  T-ratio 
Variables that affect the choice of “REPEAT” or “NO REPEAT”            
REPEAT X LNSIZE  0.124    2.29  **    0.139    2.55  ** 
REPEAT X AGE  0.003    1.20    0.002    0.74 
REPEAT X DE-LTDEBT  0.010    1.05    0.010    1.08 
Variables that affect the choice of “NO REPEAT”, “(REPEAT, 
KEEP)”, or “(REPEAT, SWITCH)"   
   
 
 
Tied Lending / No Prior Lending Relationship           
KEEP X TIELOAN  0.434    2.52  **       
KEEP X IB X TIELOAN        0.727    3.70  *** 
KEEP X CB X TIELOAN          -0.188    -0.44 
SWITCH X TIELOAN  0.095    0.45       
SWITCH X IB X TIELOAN          -0.083    -0.27 
SWITCH X CB X TIELOAN          0.478    1.74  * 
Tied Lending with Prior Lending Relationship           
KEEP X TIEPLEND  0.380    1.87  *       
KEEP X IB X TIEPLEND           0.071    0.19 
KEEP X CB X TIEPLEND          0.603    2.23  ** 
SWITCH X TIEPLEND    -0.008    -0.03       
SWITCH X IB X TIEPLEND          0.014    0.04 
SWITCH X CB X TIEPLEND          0.125    0.36   41 
 Table 7 (continued) 
 
  (1)  (2) 
  Coefficient  T-ratio    Coefficient  T-ratio 
Prior Lending Relationship / No Tied Lending           
KEEP X PRIORLEND  0.320    1.71  *       
KEEP X IB X PRIORLEND           0.161    0.64 
KEEP X CB X PRIORLEND          0.632    2.18  ** 
SWITCH X PRIORLEND  0.018    0.08       
SWITCH X IB X PRIORLEND          0.053    0.19 
SWITCH X CB X PRIORLEND          0.025    0.05 
Prior Underwriting Relationship           
KEEP X PRIORUND  0.282    2.77  ***       
KEEP X IB X PRIORUND           0.159    1.31 
KEEP X CB X PRIORUND          0.557    2.91  *** 
SWITCH X PRIORUND    -0.112    -1.08       
SWITCH X IB X PRIORUND          -0.188    -1.53 
SWITCH X CB X PRIORUND          0.072    0.35 
Coverage and Reputation            
SWITCH X CNGCOV  0.120    0.62      0.097    0.49 
SWITCH X CNGSTAR  0.737    2.36  **      0.704    2.26  ** 
SWITCH X CNGRANK  0.146    7.72  ***      0.146    7.55  *** 
Bank Classification and Constants           
KEEP X IB          0.250    1.38 
SWITCH X IB          0.312    1.85  * 
KEEP    -1.494    -8.41  ***      -1.730    -7.14  *** 
SWITCH     -1.303    -8.32  ***      -1.582    -6.78  *** 
           
IV(REPEAT)  2.490    6.83  ***      2.441    6.68  *** 
 
LR Test of Homoskedasticity [IV(Repeat) = 1] 
 
  34.97  *** 
   
  32.30  *** 
Log Likelihood    1315.01    1301.27 
T-tests for differences between keeping and switching           
KEEP X TIELOAN – SWITCH X TIELOAN    0.339     1.05       
KEEP X IB X TIELOAN – SWITCH X IB X TIELOAN          0.810    1.92  * 
KEEP X CB X TIELOAN – SWITCH X CB X TIELOAN          -0.667    -1.10 
KEEP X TIEPLEND – SWITCH X TIEPLEND    0.388     1.00       
KEEP X IB X TIEPLEND – SWITCH X IB X TIEPLEND          0.057    0.09 
KEEP X CB X TIEPLEND – SWITCH X CB X TIEPLEND          0.478    0.93 
KEEP X PRIORLEND – SWITCH X PRIORLEND    0.303     0.82       
KEEP X IB X PRIORLEND – SWITCH X IB X PRIORLEND          0.108    0.23 
KEEP X CB X PRIORLEND – SWITCH X CB X PRIORLEND          0.608    0.97 
KEEP X PRIORUND – SWITCH X PRIORUND    0.394    2.21  **       
KEEP X IB X PRIORUND – SWITCH X IB X PRIORUND          0.347    1.62 
KEEP X CB X PRIORUND – SWITCH X CB X PRIORUND          0.485    1.44 
 
*** indicates significantly different than zero at the 1% level (2-sided) 
** indicates significantly different than zero at the 5% level (2-sided) 
* indicates significantly different than zero at the 10% level (2-sided)   42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Nesting Structure 
This figure presents the nesting structure for the nested logit model of keeping the same underwriter in a subsequent SEO.  Each 
issuer has a first-level choice of re-issuing (“Repeat”) or not re-issuing (“No Repeat”).  If the issuer decides to re-issue, the issuer has 
a second level choice of keeping the underwriter of the current SEO (“Keep”) or switching to a new underwriter (“Switch”) in the 
subsequent offering. 
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